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Euthanasia and theology 
The debate over active and passive euthanasia is closely related to how 
one defines the human person. The human person involves more than 
self-consciousness and the ability to communicate. The final criterion 
ofthe goodness and rightness of an action is Intention. 
"Der erneute Streit um die Euthanasie—Theologisch-Ethische aspekte," Die Zeitschrift 
für Katholische Theologie 114 (1992) 425-39. 
V^oncern about what it means to be a 
person in the light of the renewed inter-
est in active and passive euthanasia is of 
interest not only to theology but also to 
medicine and law. 
The renewed debate has been in-
spired by a number of authors and 
books, but most notably the work of 
Australian philosopher, Peter Singer 
{Practical Ethics, 1979). As Jews, Sing-
er's parents had to flee the Nazis, and 
his grandparents were murdered by Na-
zis. 
Singer has asked: "Why is killing ob-
jectionable?" People often say that life 
is sacred. But, says Singer, they almost 
never mean literally what they say. If 
they did, they would make at least as 
much fuss about the slaughter of pigs or 
chickens as they do about a human be-
ing. "When one says that life is sacred, 
one means human life. But why should 
human life have special value?" Singer 
describes the absurdity of the position 
that human life has special value with a 
specific case. 
A mother gives birth to a child with 
Down Syndrome and a heart defect, and 
an intestinal Operation is necessary. The 
mother refuses to allow the Operation, 
but with the support of a child welfare 
agency the Operation is performed. In-
tellectually and physically the child is 
retarded. It was reported that the mother 
had the impression that a severe injus-
tice would have been done in allowing 
the Operation. Singer's conclusion from 
this case is instructive: 
In this case a being's life was 
maintained against the mother's 
wish at the cost of several thou-
sand dollars. [This was done even 
though the being] would not be 
able to live independenüy or 
speak and think like a normal hu-
man being. What a contrast to the 
nonchalant way we deal with the 
lives of stray dogs, experimental 
monkeys and cattle. What justi-
fies the distinction? 
This case contains all of the elements 
that lead to Singer's new definition of a 
person. 
1. Singer speaks of the Down Syn-
drome child as a "being" (Wesen), but 
he is not more specific about what he 
means. 
2. He makes a markedly clear dis-
tinction between this "being" and "a 
normal human being." Normal in Sing-
er's idea means living independently, 
and thinking and speaking. 
3. Does maintaining such a "being" 
make financial (cost-benefit) sense? 
4. The parallelism of the Down Syn-
drome child with "stray dogs, experi-
mental monkeys and cattle," leads to the 
rhetorical question: "What justifies the 
distinction?" The answer Singer might 
be suggesting is: There is no distinction. 
How then does Singer define a "hu-
man being?" He says a human being is 
a "member of the species Homo sapi-
ens." He admits that "a fetus produced 
by human parents from the first moment 
of its existence is a human being; and 
the same holds for the most severe and 
incurable *human vegetable.'" But 
clearly this does not follow from his ex-
ample where he speaks of a "being" in 
relationship to stray dogs. Here his talk 
of human "being," "first moment of its 
existence," and "human vegetable" is 
imprecise. 
But Singer then goes on to describe 
"human" in terms of "self-
consciousness, self-control, sense of the 
future, past, the ability to relate to oth-
ers, to grieve, communicate and be curi-
ous." 
Singer understands "human" in two 
ways: 1) a "member of the species 
Homo sapiens" that is 2) endowed with 
the capacities of self-consciousness and 
communication. The fetus, the "human 
vegetable," and the newborn child are 
all indisputably members of the species 
Homo sapiens, but none of them pos-
sesses self-consciousness, a sense of the 
future or the ability to relate to others. 
Singer goes a Step further in that his 
concept of person is not confined only 
to human beings. "TJiere can be persons 
who are not members of our species. 
There can also be members of our spe-
cies who are not persons." Thus, for 
Singer, belonging to the human species 
on the basis of biological data has no 
moral significance. 
Critique 
Singer's work has been critiqued by 
a variety of scholars in philosophy, 
medicine and theology. We can only 
mention some of these criäques here. 
According to Hans Rotter, 'The hu-
man person is not merely a random in-
stance of a general sort, but a specifical-
ly unique, irreplaceable reality." In 
contrast to Singer, the human person is 
not a developed form of the "species 
Homo sapiens," that is identical with 
chimpanzees in their personal character, 
but something "qualitatively unique." 
Singer's concentration on the capaci-
ties of reason and self-consciousness is 
typical of idealistic philosophy. Ulrich 
Eibach has asked: "Is only the 'intel-
lect' (reason) worth protecting?" 
Arno Anzenbacher says that he sees 
no possibility of refuting Singer's argu-
ment as long as one stays exclusively on 
the level of arguing from right reason. 
Singer's position can only be disputed 
by recourse to the argument from classi-
cal natural law, and the natural deter-
minedness of human existence. 
Thomas Aquinas addressed this de-
terminedness when he said that practical 
reason is related to the inclinationes 
naturales [natural inclination] as the 
"disposition to the grand, open 
scheme." In this horizon there is the 
possibility morally to argue and stan-
dardize problems of meaning and value 
with respect to the good life. The ques-
tion of humanity is obviously not defini-
tively answerable with reference to hu-
manity's determinedness. It is at the 
same time, says Anzenbacher, an open 
question that must include human self-
understanding and self-determination. 
But how can this idea have meaning 
for a severely debilitated infant in a 
coma? Jean-Pierre Wils maintains that 
the category of "human dignity" is no 
arbitrary, ideological self-designation of 
humanity. This category is much more 
the result of a history of injury and ob-
struction done to elementary rights 
where humanity is considered exclu-
sively from utilitarian perspectives. 
According to Wils, self-
consciousness constitutes the identity of 
the person: 
The knowledge that here lies a 
seif, a person, presumes a dis-
tance: the distance of "remem-
brance." Only when I can place 
myself "as" this same person 
within a time span, and remember 
myself as the originator of "my" 
present actions in this time span 
am I a knowing seif, a personal 
identity. Thus we are dealing with 
two different aspects of the "per-
son": On the one side with the 
formal, immediate (and thus unal-
terable) given power of self-
reflection, and on the other side 
with the qualified identity of the 
person with an unalterable seif. 
There are two aspects that belong to 
a person's self-consciousness: the gi-
venness of its unalterable power, and 
the experience of identity which is a 
reult of being able to distance oneself. 
This being-present-to-oneself is part of 
a human being's neuro-biological make-
up, and is permanent. 
The actual possession of self-
consciousness is the conditio sine 
qua non of the qualified seif, but 
only in a fragmentary sense. Com-
pleteness is only achieved on the 
basis of the pre-reflexive past and 
participation in the neuro-
biological processes which are at-
tained in the genesis of the person 
in his/her present. Thus, the gene-
sis of the person is at least in prin-
ciple included in the sphere of 
protection of the "actual" person 
(Wils). 
Personality, then, is an intricate fab-
ric woven within the horizon of time. 
From this perspective embryos, as well 
as newborns, are "persons," although 
they do not in actuality possess all of 
the conditions. Even comatose patients, 
or those with irreparable brain damage 
who no longer possess self-
consciousness in actuality are still per-
sons. They are subjects vested with a 
qualified seif that bestows dignity, even 
if they cannot fight for and enforce it 
themselves. 
Contra Singer, relationality means 
that other human beings, the social envi-
ronment, are responsible for maintain-
ing the dignity of people who are strick-
en, and are to protect their lives. 
Psychiatrist Jochen Vollman also 
criticizes Singer's utilitarian ethics. He 
describes human life as a dynamic pro-
cess. The actual protection of dignity 
cannot be determined by the criterion of 
pre-existing self-consciousness. 
And what about the theological argu-
ment that human beings are created in 
God's image? The difficulty here in in-
troducing a theological argument is ob-
vious because the debate "demands a 
metaphysical background without intro-
ducing basic religious convictions" (A. 
Foitzik). 
On the other hand, the image of God 
brings the dignity of human beings to 
expression in a unique way. Personal 
dignity and thus the value of life is 
"transcendent" in the fact of life itself 
and dignity is proclaimed by God to ev-
ery moment of life (U. Eibach). 
The philosophical work of Anzen-
bacher and Wils has not ignored the the-
ological foundation. The theological 
view stimulates and criticizes the moral, 
philosophical arguments. This is not the 
only, but it is still an important task of 
theology in the ethical debate. 
There are many people who do not 
fit into Singer's understanding of per-
son. The result is that there are people 
who are not worthy of protection and 
are thus to be killed. Into this category 
would fall severely deformed or retard-
ed infants, as well as those who, be-
cause of accident, sickness, or old age, 
have lost the ability to continue or to 
understand the decision process. 
Active and passive euthanasia 
In addition to the problem of defin-
ing person, there is a second problem: Is 
there no morally relevant difference be-
tween active and passive euthanasia? 
There is a difference, and not only in 
theology. Active euthanasia involves 
helping someone to die by shortening 
the death process either through lethal 
means or by means which will immedi-
ately result in death, e.g., withdrawing 
nourishment. Passive euthanasia in-
volves going through the death process 
without ignoring one's basic responsi-
bility to care for people. 
Those who oppose the distinction be-
tween active and passive euthanasia 
argue that the result in both cases is the 
same—death. There is no morally rele-
vant difference whether the doctor or 
someone eise behaves actively or pas-
sively. Singer gives the example of a 
woman who was the victim of a car ac-
cident. In a coma, a large part of her 
brain destroyed, there is no prospect of 
recovery. Only a respirator and intrave-
nous fluids keep her alive. Her parents 
visit her daily and suffer openly. One 
day they notice that the respirator is un-
plugged. If they do not plug it in, the 
victim will die. They consider the Situa-
tion and decide not to replace the plug. 
A second scenario is just as circumstan-
tial as the first, except that the respirator 
is plugged in and the Situation can con-
tinue indefinitely. The doctors do noth-
ing. After they consider the Situation 
they give the patient a lethal injection. 
Singer concludes from this case that 
there is no ethically relevant difference 
between killing and allowing to die. 
In order for Singer's position to have 
weight, one has to return again to a con-
sideration of what it means to be a per-
son. There is a difference whether I de-
velop a concept of person and human 
dignity which expresses the inviolabili-
ty of human life—philosophically and 
theologically—or whether I operate 
with a segmented concept of person 
which proceeds only from self-
consciousness and communication and 
which advocates that human beings and 
animals are on the same level. This pro-
cess calls forth "the wide ränge of theo-
logical arguments" (Klaus Demmer). 
Demmer recalls that "when one speaks 
of ethical responsibility an anthropolog-
ical choice has been made." Thus the 
question of a morally relevant differ-
ence between active and passive eutha-
nasia already implies the anthropologi-
cal preliminary decision of how one 
ouüines the close relationship between 
human life and dignity. The "anthropo-
logical Option" flows into normative 
discourse. 
Anton van den Beld Claims that the 
feelings of contradiction and guilt are 
greater in active, than in passive eutha-
nasia. These feelings are elements in 
peoples' moral world of experience, and 
are not without signficance. In addition 
to the "moral significance of these emo-
tions," van den Beld makes a further 
point. The difference is not so much in 
the decision to kill or to allow to die, 
but in the intention. Thus the doctor 
who "intentionally" allows a newborn 
mongoloid child with a closed duode-
num to die is as "morally problematic" 
as the doctor who "consciously, but un-
intentionally" kills a fetus during a hys-
terectomy. The difference is between in-
tentional and unintentional. 
In another connection, Gerhard 
Höver also sees the significance of the 
morally relevant distinction between ac-
tive and passive euthanasia. There is, 
says, Höver, such a thing as "disinter-
ested action" in the positive and nega-
tive sense. Feelings for others are the in-
itial bases for assessing their interests or 
needs in a free, face to face encounter. 
In this sense "neglect" is understood as 
an act of allowing something to happen 
of itself, and this means to respect oth-
ers in their total personhood. 
The intensity of this "allowing things 
to take care of themselves" in the sense 
of increased openness, or in the nega-
tive sense of reservedness, is the fine 
line that people use to distinguish love 
from lovelessness. The distinction be-
tween action and neglect presumes that 
one learns to understand both forms of 
behavior as two different categories of 
freedom. 
The "disinterested action" of allow-
ing things to take care of themselves in 
the face of death provides a parameter 
for all those who care for others. Also 
here "feelings for others are the initial 
basis for assessing interests or needs." It 
shows how important the distinction is 
between killing and allowing to die— 
between active and passive euthanasia. 
This does not exclude borderline cases 
and gray areas. It is not always clear 
how to act. As soon as this is the case, 
intention is decisive. Intention is the fi-
nal criterion of the goodness and right-
ness of the action (K. Demmer). 
Classically, the sources of moral the-
ology are the object, the circumstances, 
and the goal of the action (intention). 
To proceed only on the basis of the ob-
ject, in our case impending death, is not 
adequate for working out the morally 
relevant distinction between killing and 
letting die. Al l these elements must op-
erate together in order to qualify an ac-
tion as ethically good and right. But this 
action Stands within the horizon of hu-
man ethical actions generally that go be-
yond the individual case, but always 
come again to new expression within it. 
Ethical action as the self-completion of 
humanity simultaneously also says 
something about our point of view to-
ward others, final reality and toward 
God. When one decides to do good or 
evil, one becomes good or evil oneself 
and thus comes closer to or farther from 
the meaning of one's life. These actions 
happen in the "medium of time." It is 
understandable then that they can be de-
termined by the orientation to the good 
as well as by human inadequacies and 
sin. 
The theological-ethical contribution 
to the subject of helping others to die 
cannot be limited to critical argumenta-
tion against opposing views. That is 
why moral theology has spoken about 
"solidarity in the face of limits," and an 
"ethic of helping." It is these two ideas 
that contribute to human dignity and 
Christian death. 
(BAA) 
